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Abstract

The costs of primary commodity price instability are reviewed, and can be
· significant. • Even with full commitment

on

both sides and stationarity of ·prices, ·

international lending leads to nonstationary consumption. One'."period futures improve
smoothing, and a rollover plan is quite effective under first-order serial correlation.
With sovereign (exporter) risk the above instruments are infeasible. But packages of
simple bonds and put options can achieve smoothing qualitatively similar to, but less
efficient than, the constrained optimal state-contingent contracts for Markovian price
processes.

Bonds and options have the practical advantage of greater potential

liquidity than more complex contracts.
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SMOOTHING PRIMARY EXPORTERS' PRICE RISKS:
BONDS, FUTURES, OPTIONS AND INSURANCE

By

· Kenneth M. Kletzer, David M. Newbery and Brian D. Wright

Nearly three fourths of the total wealth of Norway, by a recent estimate,
consisted of oil reserves. 1 Her net oil income varies much more than the oil price,
because it is net of the substantial but relatively more stable costs of extraction.
Clearly, Norway's national income is highly sensitive .to the price of oil. Most other
developed economies have a much more diverse production mix~ making internal
diversification of commodity price risk a possibility.

But many less developed

countries, for example Mexico, Nigeria and Zambia, are each highly dependent on one
primary commodity that provides the majority of their export .earnings. Given this
specialization and the great instability of primary commodity prices relative to other
goods and services, such \countries are likely to experience unusually sharp
· fluctuations in export earnings and gross national product. In such countries domestic
diversification of income risk still leaves consumers with substantial commodity price
risk exposure. If these price fluctuations are reflected in consumption they impose risk
costs on consumers. Assuming optimal intra-temporal domestic diversification, this
·. paper considers what ,.further alternatives might be available to reduce the cost·
associated with price fluctuations in· a major commodity. To be useful, such measure
must recognize the fact those for most primary commodities, prices are serially

lAslaksen and Bjerkholt (1985, Table 5). The assumed price of oil was roughly the real price of the period 19751980.
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correlated, and so price shocks tend to be persistent, making intertemporal smoothing
more difficult.
The paper is organized as follows.

First we review the costs of income

variability caused by export price instability, with some reference to the empirical
magnitudes. Then in section 2 we consider the role of conventional instruments,
including,Ioans and futures contracts. :Partic_ular attention is paid tO' the potential use of futures rollovers for price protection when disturbances are serially correlated. All
of these instruments encounter difficulties in the presence of sovereign risk and/or
capital shortages. In section 3 we discuss the nature of sovereign default risk and its
implications when borrowers are anxious to smooth consumption.

Dynamic

consumption smoothing, with and without a default constraint, are addressed in
-section 4, for i:i.d. and Markovian disturbances... We use the·constrained optimal fully- ,, -
state contingent contract as a benchmark for evaluation of simpler contracts using
familiar, and more liquid, option and loan contracts.

1.

The Costs of Consumption Variability

Newbery and Stiglitz (1981) have set our the theory of measuring the costs of
risky consumption, and provided estimates of the extent of risk in the export of six
primary commodities from a number of developing countries. Before reviewing that
evidence it is perhaps useful to distinguish between the costs of a risky, as yet
unknown, income stream, and that of variable but predictable income stream.
According to the standard expected utility model, there is no difference in the present
value of utility of a stream of consumption, ct, which varies in a predictable way, and
one which takes the same values at each date, but whose values were not known
initially. There is however, an important difference between two identical but variable
income streams, y t, one known in advance, and the other unknown. If income is
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predictable, then it is possible to compute its present value, and to determine the
optimum time path of consumption permitted by this certain value and the
opportunities available for lending and borrowing. If income is uncertain, then such
precise consumption smoothing is not possible, and the achievable time path of ·
consumption will have lower value than in the former case. More generally, knowing
the,future,value.of focome will allow-more·.efficientdecision making generally, notjust
of consumption paths, and thus be more valuable.
Granted this, it should also be remarked that the economic value of the
additional information of the future time path of income may be small compared with
the costs of variability, and if, as Newbery and Stiglitz (1981) argued, the latter are
typically small, the distinction may not be so important. 2
With this in mind, consider the problem of calculating the cost of risk for a
country that has economically unresponsive production ('zero supply elasticity') and
which seeks to maximize the expected utility of its representative consumer
00

Vt= E'l/Jt u(cJ,

(1)

t=O

where E is the expectations operator, ct is consumption in period t, and u is felicity,
concave in consumption. The rate at which utility is discounted, that is, the rate of
pure time preference, is r. and the discount factor is f3 = 1 / (0 + r) .3

2The psychological costs of uncertainty as opposed to variability may not be so small, for a variety
of reasons, not least of which is the frequent failure of the expected utility theory to predict
behaviour by failing to accurately model perceptions of risk. Whether these costs• are real or based on
mis-perception is of course the key issue in determining the welfare basis of the expected utility
hypothesis (EUH). The maintained hypothesis here is that the EUH properly measures the actual
welfare costs.
3Since Newbery and Stiglitz (1981) the experimental evidence against the expected utility
hypothesis has continued to accumulate, and several interesting alternatives have been proposed. At
this stage, however, no alternative has replaced the expected utility approach for general analysis of
the costs of risk and the value of its reduction.

3

Using the standard formulas (given for example in Newbery and Stiglitz, 1981)
if the coefficient of (partial) relative risk aversion, is R, (defined for annual variations
in consumption), and if the CV of consumption is

<Jc,

then the annual cost of the risk,

p, is defined implicitly by u(c-p)=Eu(ct), where a bar over a variable indicates its
expected. value, and the relative cost, p I c, is approximately

.!.. R a;.

2
Let us now consider.what.these formulas.imply for the magnitudes of the .costs

of market risk borne by the consumer and the benefits of market risk reduction.
Newbery (1990) recently updated estimates of the variability of 7 'soft'
commodities, and found that price variability had increased somewhat when comparing
the period 1970-86 with the period 1950-69 and found the unweighted coefficient of
variation (CV) of prices to be 22%. 4 The costs of price instability increase as the
square of the.CV, which means that if we consider the period 1970-86, coffee price

instability (CV = 24%) is four times as costly as that of jute (CV= 12%), not twice as
costly, as the figures might otherwise suggest.
A consumer completely specialized· in production of a commodity with
"average" CV of price of 0.22, and with no output uncertainty and no variable-inputs,
has a CV of income of 0.22); If income is entirely consumed each period, the cost of
· risk to .this consumer, assuming for purposes of illustration a coefficient of relative risk
aversion R = 2, is about 5 percent of income. Were the product coffee, with a CV just
a little higher at .24, the cost of risk is higher by about one fifth, that is around 6
percent. If the export had a mean share

a

of the consumer's income, the rest of which

was essentially deterministic, the cost would be 5a 2 percent.

We can begin to

explore the practical magnitudes of the cost of risk and its reduction in four countries
highly dependent on a single primary export, using the data in Table 1.

4 Calculated as the root mean square of the average of the squared
percentage deviation from the
centered five year moving average of prices.
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The exercise addresses the following rather specific question. What would be
'the effect on the variability of commodity export revenue and of total export revenue,
assuming that the price of the commodity received by the country was equal to a price
· ·. stabilized at a weighted average of the current and previous four year's real world
price level, with linearly declining weights. 5 The levels of exports are assumed to be··
unchanged, and the export unit-•.values are assumed-,to be proportional to the world : i1
•

0

,commodity price level (and so would change by the same proportion when stabilized).. .~
There are various ways in which such a scheme might work, but the simplest would be
the commodity stabilization manager (operating in some international organization)
would first calculate the stabilized price (which is a mechanical exercise as it is based
on available data). The difference between the stabilized and spot price would be
transferred to the country (rather as is done under STABEX but not as a loan, and . ·
with the contractual implication that if the spot price exceeded the stabilized price the
country would transfer money to the stabilization manager). The crucial feature of this
stabilization scheme is that it can be implemented using observed data. Whether it
would be, feasible raises the same kinds of questions as . lending and borrowing,
considered below.

The table shows that stabilizing the price of copper halves the variability of
copper export revenue (and thus lowers the cost of that variability to one-quarter),
and has a somewhat smaller effect on ,.the variability <of .total export .revenue .
. (Variability in this case is measured as the standard deviation (SD) of percentage .
deviations from the centred five year real moving average export revenue, (effectively
the CV). It is an ex post measure of the welfare benefits.) Figs. 1 and 2 show the
5Calculated as the root mean square of the average of the squared percentage deviations form the
centred five year moving average of prices.
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effect of stabilizing the price of copper for Zambia and coffee for Brazil. (The former is
.•' an extreme example of a country heavily dependent on one primary commodity, the
latter shows the large effect of spreading the risk over all exports.) The graphs give
the percentage deviations from the centred 5 year moving average, and the graphs of
deviations of commodity exports and total exports are displaced vertically to make it·
easier .to see what is going on-commodity-deviations.are-shown on ,the-,left-hand--scale".,i,,,,,
and. total exports are on the right-hand scale. The graphs have been scaled to ·.be
directly comparable, and the prices have been deflated by the index of Manufacture
Unit Value exports to LDCs. Powell (1990) comes to a similar conclusion that price
stabilization has a rather smaller effect than might be expected for Zambia.
Stabilizing the price of coffee reduces the variability of Brazil's coffee export
·.~

-revenue by one third•-(and almost halves the cost) but has a rather small effect on the- ,_,,,,
variability of Colombia's coffee revenue. It has a smaller effect still on the variability
of total export revenue for both countries (though the levels of total export variability
are not particularly high in any case)..The final two columns give the ex post,risk
benefits of this stabilization policy, relative to commodity revenue and total export
revenue, for the value of R of 2. They are surprisingly small. Col (1) gives the share
·of the commodity in total GDP, and if stabilization had no effect on the other
components of GDP (a strong assumption), then spreading commodity price risks
evenly over the whole economy would greatly reduce their cost (to between 1 and 10%
of the values of col (7). Evidently, if producers could easily diversify their risk by
· spreading their assets across the various productive activities in place within their
country, they should have surprisingly little reason to be interested in any alternative
means of risk reduction considered below, unless these measures raised mean income
as well as reducing its risk.
However, for various reasons we do not observe full domestic diversification,
and in any case for the kind of heavily indebted countries we have in mind, we are
6

interested in the benefits of stabilizing the flow of imports. We therefore concentrate
· on cases where other means of reducing the cost of risk in commodity exports are
required. We further simplify the discussion by assuming that the country's production
of the export is non-stochastic. This reduces the problem to one of price risk, and
eliminates moral .hazard in· production .as .an: impediment to smoothing arrangements .
discussed below. These assumptions tend to ,bias the. analysis jn favour of•. such .·.
arrangements.

2.

International Transactions for Buffering Export Price Instability
If a small country produces a commodity with a highly variable revenue stream

· that cannot be diversified internally, a. natural alternative. is to attempt to ·use
international transactions to smooth consumption of its producers.
For simplicity, assume that the country in question has a negligible part of
world income, and that competitive investors exist beyond its borders who are market
risk-neutral. Further, the rate of time preference is identical for all countries and
constant over time and equal to the opportunity cost of capital in the world market.
Except where otherwise stated, there are no transaction costs, no domestic saving,
and no storage6.
Given these assumptions, all smoothing arrangements involve a transfer from
the exporter to other countries when price is high, and vice versa when price is low.
The exchange is intertemporal rather than .contemporaneous, so the ability of both
sides to credibly commit to a given arrangement is crucial in determining the amount of
smoothing that is possible.

6 storability of primary commodities has strong implications for the nature of the price process
that are not considered here. See Wright and Williams (1982), and Williams and Wright (1991) for a
more extended discussion.
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Consider, first, the case where all parties have unlimited commitment ability.
In that case a very simple contract achieves complete smoothing: sell the natural
resource industry to foreigners, in return for a perpetuity of the same net present
value. Note that continuing commitment is needed on both sides, to continue to pay
the perpetuity; on the one hand, and to continue. to export and pay the net revenues to .
. foreigners, on the other.· Note that this arrangementis '.Optimal for any price process~
for which a mean present value exists.
At this juncture even the uninitiated reader may be experiencing some
misgivings regarding the political realism of wholesale disposal of the national
patrimony of a commodity exporter to foreigners.

What about using the familiar

strategy employing international borrowing and lending?

2.1 Conventional Bonds under Commitment
Following the line of argument of a model in Newbery and Stiglitz (1981 pp.
201-203), assume that consumption ctis chosen to maximize (1), subject to.the asset
accumulation equation
(2)

where Dt is predetermined and Yt is the realization in period t of the stochastic income
process, assumed without trend or drift. To distinguish the loan arrangement from a
Ponzi scheme, add the condition that D is not expected to change, given the current
debt service obligation is-met (or,.if Dt is positive, given -that the current return on·
investment is received):
(3)

The optimal choice of ct in this problem satisfies u' (ct)= Eu' (ct+i ).
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In the simplifying case of quadratic utility,

i = 1,2, ...

(4)

Next year's expected total income including asset income is
(5)

· Given .(3), expected consumption equals- expected total income,

(6)
Solving for c1 ,

(7)
Substituting (6) in (2),
(8)

t-1
Dt +yt =Do +yo+ L(Y1-i-Et-i-1(Y1-J)

(9)

i=O

If D 0 = 0, (7) and (8) imply

(10)

Thus consumption varies directly with accumulated balances, which follow a.
martingale process. How does this compare with the best conceivable consumption
pattern?

9

If income (other than interest on D), y, follows a stationary i.i.d. process, then

intuition correctly indicates that the best consumption pattern that has an expected
present value that does not exceed that of the representative individual's endowments
is to consume the same amount each period:
(11)
,•. , c,

This;.,prescription- is.consistent with a conception .of·smoothing . as<an intertemporal ,
tradeoff between good and bad realizations. But what if y is serially correlated? In
the extreme case of a random walk, no such intertemporal tradeoff can be anticipated.
Consider the following prescription, suggested by a referee:
"[S]ay income follows a random walk then consumption should follow a
random walk if there are no adjustment costs. If there are quadratic
costs of adjustment then actual consumption should follow a partial
adjustment or the more general error-correction scheme."

-For. a country embarking on ani export stabilization scheme, the above might seem
consistent with (10) for i=t. But it is not. A borrower fully capable of commitment will
set
(12)

As in the case of stationary y, the optimal consumption path -is fully smoothed at year
t; consumption is constant thereafter.

With probability ·one the representative

consumer will in some later period t+j find this constant consumption level is less than
Yt+j

and wish that the previously agreed consumption were renegotiable; but full

commitment means that no changes in the agreement that maximized (1) in year tare
possible.

10

As noted, loans do not achieve the constant consumption level that maximizes
(1) at time t, even if we accept the heroic assumption that there is no (negative or

positive) level of B beyond which the scheme is infeasible. The fundamental problem
is that the borrower's income remains state-contingent, while her repayment received
by the lender are not. To attain greater consumption stabilization, a still stronger
assumption is needed: -Lenders must be willing and able to commit to ,future,
consumption-smoothing disbursements in some states that will not generate future
repayments of equivalent expected present value. That is, such repayments not only
violate (3) but reduce the net worth of the payer. Hence they would not be made by
an unconstrained lender.
For more effective smoothing we must go beyond simple borrowing and lending
to contracts with commitment of the smoothing party to some state-contingent. future,
payments that will render the net receipts of the "borrower" independent of the state.
We now turn to alternative financial arrangements that offer payments of this kind,
maintaining, for now, the assumption of full bilateral commitment.

2.2 Contracts for Insurance with Full Commitment

'Futures and .forward contracts can be used by exporters to reduce the price
contingency of the commodities they sell. In practice futures and forwards are similar,
but not identical, forms of contracts. The commitment mechanism peculiar to futures
(daily adjustment of margin payments and receipts in response to price changes)
introduces an analytical difference from forward contracts.

But given the full

commitment assumption we ignore this difference here.
Forward contracts can be written so that what is hedged is exactly what the
exporter will produce. For this advantage, they sacrifice the liquidity of a futures
contract, which is written in standardized units of a specified standard commodity,
(with, perhaps, fixed differentials for quality variations). A forward contract may
11

therefore have a large bid-ask spread, implying impaired flexibility of adjustment
subsequent to commitment.
For a discussion of futures contracts, it is useful to begin by defining some
notations:
Pt

Spot price at harvest in year t

Ft,j

· · •Futures price .for delivery ,after ·harvest in year t at date j < t.

bt = Pt - Ft,t

Contemporaneous basis

ft= Ft,t-1

futures price at start of year t

ft+! -ft

Intertemporal basis

Trading in futures markets exposes producers to two different kinds of risk,
./

· both confusingly called basis risk. Contemporaneous basis risk arises because the
producers who have sold futures.to hedge output typically liquidate this by buying
them back in the terminal month, and selling their output. If the terminal futures price
were equal to the spot price of what is hedged there would be no risk, but in general
this is not true, .due to (often subtle) differences in grade, location, or; other·
characteristics. So ex ante the producer faces the risk that the two prices will not be
the same-that is, the basis risk at the point of sale. While this basis is the stuff on
which futures markets survive or perish, the risk involved is small compared to the
risk of not hedging for most producers (i.e. those for which the futures market offers an
appropriate contract). Here we shall therefore ignore this type of risk, and assume in
what follows that bt = 0, or Ft t =Pt. We shall also adopt the convention for any
random variable x that Ext = Et-1 xt , and assume that the futures market is unbiased,
so that f1 = Et-1 P1 •
essentially identical.

Under these assumptions, we treat futures and forwards as
Newbery and Stiglitz (p. 186) show that, in the case of

stationary, uncorrelated output and price disturbances, the ratio of income variance
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with and without optimal forward hedging, is roughly 1 / (1 + k 2 ), where k is the ratio of
the CV s of price and output.
If prices and output are both i. i. d. and equally variable, k equals 1 and a

forward hedge can halve the cost of risk in the case of quadratic utility. Here we
simplify the·discussion (and favor the use of futures or forwards) by ignoring output
uncertainty. Then, with credible .commitment .on,.both.,sides,. full smoothing is achieved
by selling all production forward one period, via futures or forward contracts. If the
hedging is starting de novo in year t, this full smoothing starts in year t+ 1. To
advance the onset of full smoothing to year t, one could, assuming perfect capital
markets with loans as described above, take a loan on the full proceeds of the futures
(forward) sale. The combination of the loan and the forward hedge is equivalent to a
simple "commodity bond" (Priovolos 1991 ch. 1).

2.3 Hedging with Serial Correlation
Thus far, the smoothing arrangements seem simple and efficient.

But the

evidence shows that the prices of many of the major traded primary commodities
exhibit significant annual serial correlation which dramatically affects the costs and the
. benefits, and the feasibility of price stabilization. Deaton and Laroque (1989) have
studied this problem, using annual data on 24 commodity prices for the period 19001987, deflated by an index of manufacturing unit values.

Their measures of

persistence are the sum of all autocorrelation coefficients (whether significant or not),
with the sums being linearly decli0ing weighted averages over the window widths of
20 or 40 years. 7 Their results suggests that about one-quarter of price shocks are
permanent, that three-quarters or more of the price shock will persist for at least a

7The theoretical and eocnometric basis for these estimates is given in Chochran (1988) and
Campbell and Mankiw (1987). The wider the window, the more data is allowed to influence the
estimate, but at lower reliability. The wider window may thus give a downward biassed estimate
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year, and even after two years typically 60 percent of the price shock will persist. 8
/ First-order correlation coefficients average 0.8 with a standard deviation of 0.08.
The evidence suggests, therefore, that serial correlation is prevalent for the
world prices of primary commodities, and this fact should be taken into account in
designing methods for consumption smoothing.

If income is serially correlated

• •because. prices are,serially.: correlated,. a -fall. in. current income-_-__ signals .--lower..than~o:~,- anticipated income next year, and ·hence lower Yt+i· -and lower ct+! -(other things being•·
equal).

This will raise u'(ct+t) and hence lower current consumption.

If the

autoregression coefficient is near unity, consumption may be depressed almost as
much as current income and little smoothing will take place if only the annual harvest
is hedged. The volumes that must be hedged for significant consumption smoothing
· become so much ,larger that transactions costs can no longer be ignored.
Suppose for example that prices follow the simple autoregressive scheme:
(13)

where iit is -i.i.d. with zero mean, and is the forecast error at the start ofyear t. (Given ,
our assumptions on the futures price, this can be written as.
Pt

=ft + iit'

ft

=Et-1:Pt =apt-1 + (1- a)p.

Again, ft is the expected price, equal to the futures price at the start of period t
in an unbiased market.

But now the second type of basis, "intertemporal basis,"

ft+i - ( = a(p 1 - Pt-i), becomes significant because it will fluctuate from year to year,
possibly substantially. Even if futures-markets extend only one year ahead and ,incur
transactions cost, it is possible to roll over hedges to provide additional income

8Cuddington and Urzua (1988) used the same datra set and somewhat less sophisticated tehcniques,
claiming the improbable resutl that real commodity prices are 1(1). Others have claimed likewise,
though the power of the statisticala tests leaves much to be desired, especially given the leptokurtic
nature of the price ditributions.
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smoothing to that achievable within the crop year. In the Appendix we show how to
construct a sequence of rollover hedges in the futures market that provides
considerable risk reduction and insurance against this basis risk.
.The way the roll-over works is to sell more futures initially than needed for
one-period hedging, and then- use,the surplus futures -sales to finance the next year's
futures transactions.. This is not-perfect, -for ,the ,amount of.hedging required next year ,will depend\on,production, and that will depend on the futures price- prevailing next.''"'
year, which is not yet known. Consequently, despite the absence of production risk,
future output cannot be perfectly hedged, and there remains some residual risk (as
there would be if there were output risk). Nevertheless, because the costs of risk
increase with the square of the deviation, reducing the risk by a given fraction reduces
-the cost of risk. by more than that fraction and can be worthwhile.·
The appendix shows how to construct a rolling n-period hedge for the special
case of no output risk, but supply responsive to futures prices. The model has a linear
supply schedule (linear in the futures price, which is the action certainty equivalent
price in .the absence of output risk). In year t, production q 1 is planned,- and at the
start of the year q 1 [l+ a/3+...+(a/3)°-1 ] hedges are sold on the futures market.
Hedging for longer periods reduces risk, but requires additional purchases of hedges,
which of course involve additional transactions costs. The Appendix derives a formula
for the value of the additional risk benefit derived per extra present value of hedge, as
increasing the current number of rollovers involves a stream of future transaction costs
as well as a flow of future risk benefits. The formula for the marginal 'benefit/cost ratio.
from increasing the period of hedging from n-1 to n (and the number of hedges by·
(a/3)°-1) when each extra futures contract costs µ is

(a/3)°- 1 1 + a/3 R<r2
1+ /3 1- a/3 µ
The optimal length of the hedge, n, is given by
15

n = 1 + ln(µ(l + /3)(l - a/3)).

(1+ af3)Ra2

~learly, as the time horizon of the hedge increases, the marginal benefit also
· falls. Table 3 relates the optimal )hedge jength to' the value of the serial correlation .
coefficient, a, the rate of interest, r, and the forecast error, a, when coefficient of
relative risk aversion is 1, .and the transaction costs as a· fraction of the value of the ·
hedge is 0.3 of 1%-a figure taken from Gardner (1989).
Thus the table shows that if a=0.7, a=0.10, and r=15%, then it would be
worth seeing n = 5, and at a= 0.8,n should be 8. But it is clear that the value of such
hedging (on the favourable assumption of no output risk) is quite low, as transaction
costs are low and the benefit-cost ratio is in terms of these transaction costs. Higher
transactions costs would shorten the horizon over which hedging was cost-effective.
Thus the graph shows that if a= 0.8, then it would be worth setting n
at a

= 4,,and

= 0.9, n should be 8. But it is clear that the value of such hedging (on the

favorable assumption of no output risk) is quite low, as transaction costs are low and
the benefit-cost ratio is in terms of these transaction costs. Higher transactions costs
would shorten the horizon over which hedging was cost-effective.
The other point to make is that the number of hedges rises with the horizon,
which would increase the risk of performance default if the contracts did not require
payment of margin calls as the futures price changes, to cover any change in the value
of the contract. The. transaction· costs. calculated by .Gardner· include-,the foregone •· ·
interest rate differential on the money left on deposit to cover margin calls, and this
can be thought of as ensuring contract performance. A two-period version of this
arrangement would be in effect a commodity bond, a combination of a futures hedge
and a loan on the proceeds. The loan would be used as a performance bond to ensure
that the hedger delivers on the contract, were the latter not liquidated by an offsetting

16

trade. 9

But this just shifts the commitment issue back one step.

What ensures

repayment of the loan? Until recently the financial literature on commodity bonds
(Brennan and Schwartz 1980, Schwartz 1982, O'Hara 1984; Priovolos and Duncan,
eds., 1991 chapters 2 - 7), like the literature on futures markets, has neglected the
commitment issue; but that is central to the discussion of intertemporal international
transactions.

3. The Structure of Commitments and Exporters' Smoothing Contracts

Here we focus on income-smoothing financial transactions between investors
in developed countries (DCs) and a less-developed country (LDC) heavily dependent
· on a single/commodity subject to substantial revenue fluctuations.

In smoothing

transactions the net-financiaLflow in any periodis in general unbalanced; there is none
of the mutuality characteristic of balanced real trade. If transactions are considered
period by .period, there is in general an incentive for one party or the other to repudiate .
its current obligation.
The case with pure price uncertainty is illustrated in Figure 3, in which the
world spot price ·P1 ison the horizontal axis and the exporter's contract payment per
unit committed are shown on the vertical axis. If all sales are spot, then payment per
unit and Pt are related by the 450 line OA.
Under aforward contract, the borrower's incentive to default is the difference
between the spot price at maturity, P1; and the forward·price to be;paid on delivery.
The latter equals the expected price P as of .the signing of. the contract, under the
assumptions of risk neutrality, competitive buyers, and credible seller commitment to

91n continuous time, the additional adjustment of variation margin as the futures price changes is
necessary to ensure performance.
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deliver. The short-run temptation to default (to be weighed against any effects on
future smoothing opportunities) is P1 -P; the higher the spot price, the greater the
temptation. The short-run default incentive of the buyer of the contract (the "long"
side) is/ symmetrically, P - Pt. The simple (non-contingent) commodity bond can be .
considered as a combination of a one-period loan:and a forward contract of the same
. .·duration. .-In ,such •·.a contract, the borrower·incurs,at-the-outset ·atepayment obligation.,,,_.,/
of-P per-unit of exports (from·a loan of-P-/ (l'+r) per unit'in-the·previous :period) in" A.,·
addition to the delivery obligation. This adds the amount of the loan repayment under
compliance, P, to the short-run incentive to default. The temptation to default (more
precisely, to repudiate one's obligations) is thus Pt.
These default temptations at time t must be balanced against the opportunity
·cost :of defaulting.

For full -.commitment the latter must dominate.. In domestic

. transactions these default incentives are counterbalanced by legal constraints on the
smoothing party (the "lender" or "insurer" and by the threat of loss of collateral of the
smoothed party ("the .borrower" or ''.the insured") if it does not fulfil its obligations..
Lack of such collateral. constitutes the key distinction between such domestic
transactions and their international counterparts, as recognized by many
commentators and deseribed in masterly fashion by Keynes (1924). Respect for
sovereign immunity precludes the forced seizure or destruction of assets within the
borders of a sovereign state by foreigners. In the absence of attachable collateral,
incentives for repayment other than the threat of foreclosure must be found to support
· smoothing transactions in equilibrium. ·. · .Interference with .some' external ,trading• "· ·
opportunities, such as denial of future access to loans or disruption of current
commodity trade, is the sanction most widely recognized as providing repayment
incentives (see Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), Eichengreen and Portes (1989a and
1989b) and Bulow and Rogoff (1989), for example). Lenders (including all effectively
risk-neutral suppliers of smoothing financial flows) can disrupt intratemporal
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transactions because they have access to courts to enforce debt seniority clauses
against all other potential lenders, so that the borrower cannot repudiate a debt and
repay subsequent debts or acquire foreign assets. Repudiation leads to the possible
elimination of foreign borrowing or lending opportunities. The cost of repudiation is the
loss of future consumption smoothing that could have been available. The amount that
··the -borrower· is. willing .to pay. to ·her current creditors. depends on•. her. expectations . of
future lending conditional on her current behavior.
In the analysis below, we assume that the sanctions that support international
financial transactions are the threat of disruption of intertemporal foreign trade, that is
access to international borrowing and lending. We further assume that lenders in
developed countries can commit themselves to make payments in some future states
to the borrower. - That is, they can write contracts binding them to make contingent
payments that may not be profitable to make ex post (as in the case of futures and
options contracts). Lenders are also competitive and offer loans that are expected to
be profitable given the equilibrium behavior for the borrower.

But given our

commitment assumption, lenders can write ex ante expected profitable loan contracts
with state-contingent repayment schedules such that repayments are negative in
some states. 10
Other commitment structures would led to very different smoothing
relationships. Kietzer and Wright (1990a) assume that lenders also cannot commit
their future actions beyond respect for the seniority of other lenders' claims. 11 Thus

1OThe assumption of one-sided creditor commitment is also made in the sovereign lending
literature by Atkeson (1991), Bulow and Rogoff (1989b) and Worrall (1990), and is implicit in
others. Because equilibrium contracts often lead to negative forward-looking expected profits for
lenders, these are not models of renegotiation of repayments, as are Bulow and Rogoff (1989a) and
Kietzer and Wright (1990a).
11 In a sequel, Kietzer and Wright (1990b) prove that if no party can commit their future actions,
then respect for senriority can be sustained in a noncooperative equilibrium Therefore, some
smoothing of the borrower's consumption is feasible under anarchy (that is, without external
enforcement of contracts).
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lenders are able, if they wish, to refuse to provide any smoothing flows in any period.
Both parties are free to renegotiate the relationship each period. With renegotiation of
repayments, one-period simple loan contracts are shown to achieve the constrained
optimum. Repayment obligations can be renegotiated down to zero but are never
negative in equilibrium as they can be under the assumptions here.
Bulowand·,Rogoff:(1989a)model 'renegotiation of repayments~bra-,sovereign ,-:. ; -•: when foreigners can credibly threaten to disrupt the commoditi trade-of the debtor ini .,,,
each period and there is no consumption-smoothing motive for borrowing (all parties
are risk-neutral). Each period the borrower and lender bargain over the amount to be
paid by the borrower so that she can trade that period. This is equivalent to the
situation in which the lender acquires monopoly rights to supply the imports desired
by the borrower, and the terms oftrade are determined by the, equilibrium for the
bilateral monopoly bargaining game.

The amount, of repayment just equals. the

difference between this equilibrium price and the lender's opportunity cost (for
example, the world price). , One could readily .add contemporaneous trade sanctions
.(exactly as in Bulow and Rogoff) to our model. All that changes is that the price, p,
received by the exporter is, not the world price but instead the equilibrium bilateral
monopoly price. The focus of this paper is on the use of external financial markets for
consumption-smoothing; lending does not serve to smooth consumption in the Bulow
and Rogoff trade sanctions set-up.
For simplicity, we concentrate on the case of pure price uncertainty so that
income is y =pq, where q is fixed output.

The exporter is tempted to default

whenever her expected utility from consuming her income in the current and every
future period (after she observes the current -price) exceeds the utility she expects to
receive from maintaining access to consumption-smoothing by paying her creditors.
Efficient equilibrium borrowing and lending constrained by sovereign immunity is
characterized below. Since the borrower is risk-averse, she will be willing to pay
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more to preserve access to consumption-smoothing from abroad when her income is
high than when it is low. In equilibrium, the borrower is willing to pay nothing in the
lowest income state to avoid permanent exclusion from credit markets, but in the
equilibrium smoothing relationship she is never expected to do so. As her income
-rises, her willingness to pay increases;- so that in ,this sense the costs of-default .
increase with income, as one commentator has,noted. But so does the~temptation to

:A

-·., default: The,high-income states are the states in which she is expected to .pay for the < (r
0

smoothing she receives in lower states.
The commodity's price is assumed to be distributed over a finite number of
possible states according to a Markov chain.

That is, the probabilities for each

possible income state in period t depend only on the income realized in period t-1.
This• includes the case of a simple autoregressive process (with disturbance
distributed over a finite support). •· There are S states, ordered y1 < y2 < ...< ys , . and
the probability that yj occurs in period t+ 1 is a function of Yt> denoted niyJ

4. Overview of Dynamic Smoothing Strategies

,Depending.· on the degree of price risk, the intensity of risk aversion, the
discount rate and other factors, the otherwise optimal smoothing plan may or may not
induce the exporter to default. Let us consider the alternate cases in turn.

4.1 Default Constraint Nonbinding

From an initial uncovered situation, the availability of commodity bonds adds to
the short-run resources represented by initial income y1 • Assume that the sovereign
starts with no savings, but that she can save overseas in the countries that host the
international lenders. Assume also that these lender countries collectively enforce
financial contracts within their borders. In particular, they cooperatively enforce claims
21

by foreigners on domestic assets, and senior claims of domestic lenders on sovereign
borrowers. are enforced with respect to all inflows from sovereign borrowers, including
savings deposits as well as loan repayments. 12

If so, one description of the optimal

.infinite·horizon smoothing plan for implementation in period. I, given current income y1,
·.. . (assumed for this exposition· to, be ·entirely·from export-of one .commodity .at.price p), •
.. · and the. discount, rate equal. to the. interest. rate sis as follows: Invest .f3 y 1.; where

/3 ·=··· ;

· .. l/(l, + r), overseas for a certain periodic rate of return of r, jssue a simple c:..bond ·.. ;;

payable in units of the commodity to cover all output, with current sale price
consume r/3y 1 + {3y in each period 1, 2, 3,....

f3y,

and

Full consumption smoothing is

immediately achieved forever: consumption is the same for all periods and states.
The opportunities for legally protected overseas investment at the (certain)
,.market interest rate and,.,for trade in c-bonds (or, equivalently~ in futures and
conventional bonds) at unbiased prices are all the financial facilities needed for.this
plan. Furthermore, note that, if the initial income y 1 is invested where it can be
collateralized for the c-bond loan ,(for example in the lending country), the default
constraint is relaxed relative to the comparative static analysis above that assumed
all income was from sales of c-bonds and none of the current income in the period in
• ¾. .

which-.c~bonds were.•introduced was saved. So, even if full c-bond coverage seemed
infeasible in that analysis, the above strategy may work.
If one ignores transactions costs, as we do here, a number of different

combinations of contracts could replicate the above arrangement, given the
assumption of a non binding default constraint.. One example is a short forward contract
plus a loan on the anticipated proceeds of the contract.

12Both types of enforcement together support the dynamic smoothing contracts that follow.
Bulow and Rogoff (1989) show that if the former type alone is effective, the smoothing strategies
formulated below do not work.
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4.2 Default Constraint Binding
If the default constraint binds on hedging with commodity bonds or forward

contracts, the full smoothing described above is infeasible. The alternative of using
futures markets is precluded because the .variation margin requirements that make
default unattractive cannot be met by a liquidity-starved borrower.

Nor will the

margin calls be loaned by a third party lender because of the induced incentive of the
borrower to defaulLon. those loans~ ·.·What· kinds of consumption smoothing contracts·•
are feasible in such cases? The common type of commodity bond, (see Priovolos 1991
for a list of recent issues), with a call option for the buyer, is clearly inappropriate for
this type of smoothing. True, the premium associated with the option would increase
the lower consumption levels if the contract were feasible. But by selling the call to
·,· the lender, the borrower places herself under great temptation of.default when price is
high, and gets very inefficient low-end protection.
A more promising strategy is to limit the maximum temptation for the borrower
by giving her some share in the .marginal gain from increases in high prices, while
limiting her maximum losses. A fully state-contingent loan contract would be ideal.

4.2.1 The optimal state-contingent, default-proof insurance contract
Before presenting the commodity bond package, we consider as a standard of
comparison the optimal consumption plan for a risk-averse sovereign commodity
exporter, "the borrower."

Assume that the risk-neutral lender must achieve non-

. ·. negative expected profits at· the onset of a long-term contract and that there is free '"
entry. The exporter, unlike the lender, can repudiate the long-term relationship at any
time, and will do so whenever permanent autarky is superior to continuation of the
consumption-smoothing relationship.
The problem is to maximize
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..
u(c1) + E1I,/Jt-i u (ct),

(14)

t=2

with respect to state-contingent consumption plans {ct}: 1 , where ct

=ct (y1, ... , yt) ,

subject to the no-default constraint for the borrower

..

..

i=l

i=l

u(ct)+ EtL,/Ji u(ct+J ~ u(yt) + EtL,/Ji,u(Yt+J

(15)

for every t = 1, 2, ... , and the profitability constraint for the lender,

..
(16)

(Y1 -c1)+El/Jt-l (yt-ct)~o.
t=2

where Et is the expectation operator conditional on date t information.
This is similar to the problem of finding an optimal implicit long-term wage
contract, as in Holmstrom (1983). We can rewrite it as a dynamic programming
problem.•
wt= (y 0 ,

••• ,

Define

the

history

of

states

as

where

Yt) and wt+I = (wt> yt+1). Let V1(V~, Yt) represent the maximal surplus

Jhat,the exporter.gets"'at time t from the consumption smoothing plan over permanent
autarky when the risk-neutral "lender" receives profit
V~. will be a function of wt' that is

v; = V (wJ
2

v;.

At time t the lender's profit

The function, V1(-), is given by the

optimality equation:
(17)

subject to
(18)
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and
(19)

Solving (14) - (16) for the state-contingent infinite horizon consumption plan is
equivalent to solving problem (17) at each date t, in each event wt> for ct and the
(promised) profit to the lender in each state of nature, yt+i , for the next period, by
Bellman's principal. A sufficient condition for a solution to (17) to exist is that the
global endowment is bounded in each period (so that ct is bounded).
Because u(c) is strictly concave and continuously differentiable, -the function . ··
V1 (v~. Yt) can be shown to be strictly concave and continuously differentiable in V~ as
well. (The constraints define a convex choice set; with bounded global endowment, it
is also compact.) We form a Lagrangian for problem (17) and assigning the multiplier.
A(wi) to constraint (18) and multipliers n1 (i)/3 q,(wt>y 1 ), ••• ,ns(Yt)/3 q,(w 1 ,ys) to the
constraints (19), we obtaiff-from the first order conditions and envelope condition:
(20)
(21)

C
1or
every yt+i

= y1, ... , yS .

The Euler condition (20) implies that consumption is monotonically increasing
over time until consumption for the next period is the same for all states, in which case
it equals consumption in the current period and a steady state is reached.
Consumption is smoothed across states in period t+ 1 for which the default constraint
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is not binding and is higher for states in which the constraint is binding. Higher
consumption in such states, at the expense of lower consumption in earlier, lower
states, is necessary to match the utility from repudiation; <P(wt'Yt+i) is not zero only if

..v1(v~~1,

yt+l) is equal. to zero. In general, consumption will not be fully smoothed

across time beginning in date 1 in .contrast with the~case without sovereign risk-<.
(compare (15) with (20)).
Since income follows a Markov.chain, the. utility possibility set depends .only on -~,,
the current resources available, Yt+i, so that when V1t is zero the borrower's
consumption defined by
(22)

depends only on Yt. .Equations (9) and (10) imply that <P( wt+ 1 ) and ct+i depend on ct
and yt+1 everywhere along the equilibrium path.
We make the additional assumption that the distribution of income displays
first-order stochastic dominance in previous, period income, •
s

that is,

s

I,nj(Yt)~I,nly;), whenever Yt>y; for every l<k<S.
j=k

The mean-reverting

j=k

autoregressive process, used above in the discussion of hedging with full commitment
under serial correlation, satisfies this assumption. It can be proved (recursively over
y using (22) starting with y1 ) that there is a series of consumption levels £i such that

13 If

y is distributed i.i.d., then the £j are given by
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Under free entry, the profit for lenders in period 1 is zero, so that first period
consumption solves

The dynamics for borrower consumption can now be described. There exists a
state, 1 ~ n

, Yi

~

y

0
,

~

S, · which depends on all ofthe parameters of the problem, such that if

then consumption is immediately and fully smoothed for all dates arid states: , •··

from period 1 on. That is, if y1 ~ y 0 then there is a c 1 that satisfies
00

C1 = Y1 + E1 Lf3t-i (Yt - c1)
t=2

and

If y 1 < y 0 , for n > 1, these two conditions cannot be satisfied. In that case there is a

1 ~ j < S, such that

state j,
c

1

~

ci and c < ci+l
-

1

-

Consumption in period 2 equals c1 if y 2 is less than or equal to y1. If y 2 = yi > y1, then
consumption rises to c 2 = £i.

In general, ct= £i where yi = max{y1, ... ,yt' and yi}.

Whenever c 1 < £5 , the steady state consumption is equal to £5 •

Long run

consumption only exceeds £5 if the borrower's consumption is· fully smoothed across·
all dates, that is, if the constrained first-best is an unconstrained Pareto optimum..

4.2.2 Implementation with one-period state-contingent loan contracts
The constrained first-best can be achieved using one-period loan contracts
incorporating state-contingent repayment schedules under free entry by competitive
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risk-neutral financiers, equivalently "lenders" "investors" or "insurers", assuming
seniority is enforced.

The loan contract specifies a loan made in period t to the

borrower, .e(w1) and a repayment schedule, R(w 1,y1+1) for t+l. The zero expected
profit condition is

Using the solution to the first-best problem (6), simply set
R(w1-1,Y1)=

v;

R(wt>Y1+1)= V2(wt>Y1+1)
.e(w1) = c 1 +

and

v; -y1 .

Given that:the lenders' surplus in period 1 is zero and constraint (18), we have that

A consequence of the solution to the dynamic programming problem, (17)-(19),
is that Vz(wt' Yi+i) is increasing in Yt+i for all w1. This implies that

/3 E 1V2(wt' Yi+i)

is

non-decreasing in y1 when the distribution of income is a Markov chain displaying
first-order stochastic dominance.
R(w 1),

is increasing in

y1 :s:; max

{yi,

The one-period state-contingent loan repayment,

y1 for

all

y1 since it equals

V2 (wi).

For

y 2, ... , Yt+i}, the repayment is increasing at least one for one with y1

because consumption in period t is constant for these states and

/3 E 1V2(wt' Yi+i)

is

non-decreasing in y 1. If income is i.i.d., then./3 E;V2(wi,Yt+i) is constant for different
realizations of y1 no greater than the max {y\ y 2, ... , y1_1}, so that R is increasing one
for one with income in this range. By our definition of .e(w1), it also follows that
.e(wt>Yt+1):s:;.e(w1)ify1+1 :s:;yt.
The long-term optimum subject to sovereign immunity for the borrower can be
implemented using short-term contracts since these lenders can commit themselves
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to any level of surplus (R(wt>Yt+i)) for each state in the next period, replicating what
commitment does in the long-term contract yielding the constrained first-best. This is
an extension of the argument given by Worrall (1990) for the case of i.i.d. incomes.
, Because lenders can commit themselves in period l to the long-term first-best .
contract,

Vl

can be negative in general for some states and periods after the first.

This implies that- R( wt) can. be negative for some w i· In fact· R( wt) must be negative ·
· for some yi if first period consumption is less than steady state ·consumption or· if
y1 > y1 and consumption is smoothed for all dates. Suppose that repayments are non
negative for all states for each contract chosen in the steady state and that first period
consumption is less than steady state consumption. The repayment schedule for a
contract chosen in the steady state when state y1 = yk, 0 ~ k ~ S, could be offered by
a free entrantin the first period and earn non-negative profits, a contradiction.

R(w1)

must also be negative in at least the lowest state y1 if consumption is smoothed
immediately and initial income y1 exceeds y1 • This is because the borrower receives a
net transfer of c * - y1 in the lowest state, but the steady state loan he receives in that
state is no greater than the loan she receives in the first period c * - y1 , which is less
than the net transfer in the lowest state.
It is useful to separate the state-contingent one-period loan contract into two
parts, a loan that is repaid with certainty in equilibrium and an insurance contract for
the next period. The amount lent is the same, .e(wt), and the repayment is just
; .e(wJ The insurance contract is actuarially fair and specifies a premium net of
indemnity of

If y is distributed i.i.d., then the loan and insurance contracts chosen in period t

are the same for all states Yt ~ max {Yi,···,Yt-1' yi}. When the distribution of y is not
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i.i.d. (but is Markov satisfying our assumptions), then the insurance premium depends
on Yt even though planned consumption for each state Yt+t is the constraint for all
Yt ~ max {Yp••·•Yt-P yj} (since the probabilities n; depend on Yt). This implies that

the Joan taken out in period t varies with Yt even if Yt ~ max {Yi,••·•Yt-t• yj}. The.
borrower's debt follows an .autoregressive · process, but .it does satisfy· the
.conventional solvency. constraint, and the current debt,is always paid with certainty.,,'

4.2.3 Smoothing with commodity bonds

We now discuss how a commodity bond constructed as a combination of a one
period simple loan and a put option for the exporter can achieve feasible smoothing for
the LDC. This combination of contracts provides a pattern of consumption over time
and -states similar to that achieved by the one-period state-contingent loan contracts.
The commodity bond generally fails .to provide ·the same level of surplus for the
exporter as attained in the constrained first-best.

It has, however, the offsetting

advantage of simplicity and the associated .potential for more liquid trading .as a ·
relatively· standardized instrument.

Our discussion here extends and makes more

precise the analysis of commodity bonds in Wright and Newbery (1989) by allowing
for autocorrelation in the income process and characterizing the welfare sacrifice of
using simple instruments.
The I-period put option on the commodity has strike value y;. The exporter
exercises the put if y t ~ y;, receiving income y;. The option premium, z;, is given by
the zero profit condition:

30

This must be paid in every state. We let it be paid at date t, the same date that the
put is exercised or expires.

Therefore, the exporter gets from this option the net

income:

Now;·let. the· exporter :also have access to a loan..market• with· standard -non- .
· '. state,..contingent bonds (one..period). The penalty for non-repayment-is removal·of all." .
opportunities for smoothing in the future, whether by borrowing or via options. In
period t, she chooses an option contract with strike value Y:+i for the next period and a
loan R.t (positive or negative).

The repayment due at t+ 1 is R.t / /3

,

so that her

consumption at t+ 1 is

To find the equilibrium path in c-bonds, define the state variable:

At time t, the exporter chooses R.t and

y:.

The equilibrium problem is the same as the following dynamic programming
problem:

with respect to (R.t'y;)
subject to
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where ct= Dt +.et.
Let nk (y t) cf>k (wt) be the multipliers for each of the constraints

The first order conditions with respect to it can be written as

and the first order condition with respect to y;+1 is

Because z;+1 = Et[max {i+i - / ,0}] , the first-order condition with respect tO/Y;+1
becomes

s

l[ nk (1 + cf>k)v'(Dt+l>l)]- l
k:s;j

1rk(1 + cf>k)v'(Dt+l>l)l nk] = o

k=l

k:s;j

w here y i-t < y *t+t _< y i de f'mes J. e {1 ,...,S}
Thus,

The pattern of smoothing is qualitatively similar to that when unrestricted
state-contingent loans are available.

But the insurance contract implicit in that
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scheme has a premium net of indemnity payment that increases with income levels
such that consumption is higher than in the previous period. Here, the insurance part
of the contract is the put option, for which the borrower's payment to the importer is
constant for income realizations above the strike value. Another way of stating this
difference· is that the net income available to the borrower int is given by [y t - R( w i)]
in the constrained first-,-best and by Bt in the commodity bonds scheme.'. Rt., varies
with•• yt. to keep the default constraint binding in states for which consumption goes up;
in the commodity put case, Bt is constant for similar states. The two net payment
schedules for the borrower are illustrated in Figure 4.

Both coincide only when

consumption is fully smoothed (as it will be in the steady state) or if there are only
two states.
In· the ·constrained ·. first-best, when · consumption cannot be completely
smoothed from period 1 on, the no default constraint is binding whenever consumption
rises. This is not true, in general, for the solution to the commodity bond problem; the
multipliers may not all be zero for states above the strike state.
Because this problem is more complicated than that for the constrained first
best, we first note how the. contract choices and consumption evolve when income is
i.i.d..

From the first order conditions,

and </Jk = 0 for k<n where
* }
n=max {k:yk <
- y t+l
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For yk < yn, consumption ct+ 1 is monotone increasing in y

;+

1•

We start by describing the dynamics for the put option and non-contingent
. . bond scheme in the i.i.d. case. Initial income is y 1 • The exporter takes a loan l 1 and · ·
consumes· c1 = y1 + £1 in the first period. She"also contracts for a put option ,with strike
income and premium.

Next period, if y 2 ~ y;,

y; is chosen so .that.in equilibrium the exporter does not default in any states
at t = 2, given £1 , and c 2

= c1 if y 2 ~ y; .

If y; < ys, then there is a state such that the

exporter is indifferent between being able to .continue smoothing her consumption and
.permanent autarky in period 2. Choosing a higher strike income than y; to obtain
more insurance for period'·2 would lower first period consumption. There is a trade-off
·between smoothing across states of nature at date 2 and between dates 1 and 2.

If y 2 ~ y;, the Euler equation implies that the exporter chooses the same put
option and non-contingent loan repayment (£1 /
first period t in which Yt exceeds

/3) for period 3 as for period 2.

y;, her choice of strike income rises to a level

sufficient to smooth her consumption in the following .period for all
choice of loan also changes.

In the

The new put is exercised for all

Y~+t

~Yt-· ·.Her>.;.·

Yi+t ~ Yt>

and the

borrower chooses a new loan to make c 1 as large as possible without causing her to
choose to default in any state in the next period, t+ 1, in equilibrium.
Once the highest state

i

occurs, consumption is smoothed across all states

and remains constant thereafter. In equilibrium for the commodity bond scheme there
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is a monotonically rising consumption floor similar to that for the first-best (for the
i.i.d. case).
Steady state consumption is given by
c*

=Ey + (1 -1 / /3)l*

since

To avoid default in the steady state, c * must be at least as great as f.s. This implies
that there is an upper bound on lk for conventional solvency to hold. 14 The commodity
bond scheme achieves the constrained first-best-if initial income is. high enough to
allow complete smoothing at f.s. 15 The two also coincide if
the initial strike value for income.

y8 is the only state above

While the consumption level such that the no

default constraint is binding in the steady state is f.s, consumption levels such that the
no default constraints are binding, in general, will exceed f.i, for all j<S.
In the optimum for the borrower, the steady state loan, l*, is equal to l 1+1
where ys occurs for the first time in period t. Recall that the non-contingent bond
chosen in any period is the same for all y t ~

y: in the i.i.d. case.

The amount borrowed

in period t depends on the sequence of strike incomes that have been chosen in all
previous periods. For example, if Yt ~ y; for every j < t, steady state consumption will
be different that it would be if for some j, l< j < t, y; < y; <

y8. The commodity

14For a given djstribution of y and concave function u(c), if the discount rate is large, f.s will
· exceed Ey so that l must be negative. The exporter must invest some of her current resources abroad
and use the interest to assure that steady state consumption exceeds £ . (Domestic investment is
ruled out by assumption, and foreign investment is subject to seizure by creditors if there is a
default.)
1 5Full smoothing is not possible given sovereign risk if the initial state satisfies:

f.s

>(1-/3)Y1 +/3E y.
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bond scheme results in less efficient smoothing over time than occurs in the first-best.
That is, the initial consumption will be lower and the steady state consumption higher,
in general. This welfare cost is due to using a simpler financial contract that does not
·. provide as much insurance across states exceeding the strike state.
An example with i.i.d. income and three states is used to illustrate the
commodity bond dynamics. Suppose that initial income y1 = y1. We assume that full
smoothing over all dates is infeasible and that the parameters of the problem are such
that period 1 strike income is less than y 2. This will be the case if c1 < £ 2 in the
constrained first-best (which is possible).
With i.i.d. income the consumption level once y 3 first occurs depends upon
whether or not y 2 is realized earlier. If y 2 occurs before y 3 first occurs, then the
equilibrium contracts satisfy:
Cl= yl + £1 = (y*l - zl )-

~

+ £1,

1
2 2
C2 = (y2 - z )- .e1 / /3 + l2 = (y * - z )- .e2 I /3 + l2 ,
and
z1 = n1(Y*1-y1)
where
and

z2 = n1(y*2-y1)+n2(y*2-y2),

y*3 -z3 = Ey.

We also have that c 3 ~ £3 and c 2 ~ £ 2.

If y 3 first occurs before y 2 does, then c 1 is as above and
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These can all be solved to show that l.3 ;::: l. 3 '
equality only if y *2

= y2 •

,

so that c 3 ';::: c3 , so that with

We also have that c 3 ;::: £3 but that c 2 ;::: !l. Therefore we also

must have that ci is lower than it would be in the first-best.
· Figure 5 displays the four possible consumption levels and strike. incomes y* 1
and y* 2 •
When the commodity's price js autocorrelated, then the pattern of consumption
·smoothing can be more complicated because the loan contract,chosen with the. put
option will depend on the state even if the state realization is below the strike income.
This happens when income is distributed according to a Markov chain (other than
i.i.d.) because the probability of states above the strike income occurring in period t+ 1
depends on Yr so that the option premium for a given strike, Y;+l' depends on Yr:
s

zt+1 = In-;(Yr)max{y;+1 -y;,o}.
i=l

To keep consumption in period t+ 1 equal to consumption in period t, zt+ 1 - lr+i / /3
needs to be constant across different realizations of the state, y t. That is, compare
two values for y t below .the .strike income chosen in t- l for period t and .choose the
same strike income, Y;+ 1 for period t+ 1 for the two potential period t realizations.
Now, for cr+i to be the same as ct' l.r+i must be larger for the higher Yr (since we
assume that the distribution displays first-order stochastic dominance in Yr).
If the steady state is reached, the non-contingent loan will evolve according to

where c• is steady state consumption.
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Since steady state consumption must be at least £s, the restriction that these loans
always be repaid with certainty imposes a constraint on the amount of debt the
borrower has outstanding when state S is reached.

This implies (from the Euler

condition) thauhe non-contingentJpan and put option selected at date t in equilibrium .
depends on the entire history. of income realizations, w 1 • · The ·strike income· will· rise
monotonically from y; to ys asin theJ.i.d. case;. but may. rise even if Yt <

y; in the .

Markov case. The consumption floor rises over time, as in the:frrst-best case, but the
consumption floor might rise even if the strike income y; exceeds y1 • Furthermore if
y1 < y;, consumption can be rising with y1 • (But note that c1 is always at least as
great as c1_ 1 • This behavior contrasts with the consumption dynamics for the first
best non-contingent loan and insurance contract scheme for the Markovian case
, (discussed in Section 4i 2. 2. above.).
In the constrained .first-best, the exporter can insure herself as much as
possible subject to the no default constraints. Given the initial realization for income,
she can trade all of the risk in her permanent income with the foreign lenders for a
consumption plan that respects those constraints. Even when the set of instruments
is restricted fo simple bonds and options, lender commitment still results in a
.monotonically rising . consumption for the exporter, even when income is serially
correlated. The cost of simplicity is reflected in the fact that the consumption path
starts at a lower level if the initial income state is low. But these costs must in
practice be weighted against the reduction in transactions cost associated with
reduced contractual complexity and greater market liquidity. · ·
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5. Conclusions
Price risks may be significantly costly for exporters specialized in primary
commodities. Even if there were no problem of contractual commitment, international
. loans of the conventional type would not provide .optimal risk-sharing between risk
averse exporters and' a capital market riska.neutral with· respect to the prices of the
exports in question.
· Futures or forward contracts offer theinsurance necessary to improve upon the ·.. ,
risk-sharing achieved by loans with full commitment. Indeed futures contracts with
maturities of one production period (roughly the maximum maturity observed in
practice) can achieve substantial long-term protection, even if one recognizes the
empirical fact that prices are positively serially correlated. The marginal net benefits
,,i ,of.Jengthening

,the .horizon beyond one production period (roughly ·what is ,observed in · ·.·.1¥

practice) depend upon transactions cost, the degree of serial correlation, and the
discount factor. The extra benefits of a substantially longer hedging horizon may often
be rather small.
If production responds to incentives with a one-period lag, the rollover strategy

does not provide perfect protection at the time the hedge is made. This is true even if
.. .. production response to inputs is non-stochastic, in contrast to the case of one-period
hedging.
In cases where a sovereign exporter can offer no collateral, and is short of
liquid resources, the use of futures is precluded by the need to furnish the margins that
guard against default. . Standard, loans and, buffer funds. have the disadvantage that .. ·
they will with probability one reach crisis states in which the resolution of the crisis is
. ill-defined; recognition of this by potential lenders no doubt dampens their enthusiasm·
for such contracts somewhat.
In this context with full lender commitment commodity bonds with a put for the

seller (borrower-exporter) offer at least part of the benefits of using fully state39

contingent contracts constrained only by sovereign immunity. In fact when initial
conditions are sufficiently good the two are identical. A straight commodity bond
suffices for fully smoothing consumption. When the initial state is bad, commodity
bonds combining a put and a loan for the exporter can achieve some degree of
consumption smoothing in: the face of random export prices for commodity-dependent ~·:r·' •
countries that cannot offer credible collateral for foreign loans. This is true even if·
prices are· Markovian rather than i.i.d. Consumption is nondecreasing over time and
becomes fully smoothed if and when the highest income state is visited.
Though a bond with a put option does not in general achieve a constrained
efficient consumption path, it has the significant practical advantage of comprising two
similar and simple instruments that might have more liquid markets, and hence
·.•. reduced,transaction~costs, ·Telative to· a constrained efficient contract ·with. country
specifics state contingencies. Moreover, in equilibrium the bonds are always repaid in
full; there is no prospect of costly loan renegotiations. This commodity bond package
contrasts with commonly observed commodity bond contracts, which generally attach
a call option for the buyer to the loan. The consumption-smoothing achieved reduces
downside exposure of the\seller, while leaving her a sufficiently large share of high
realizations that she is not tempted to default.
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Table 1. Effects of Completely Stabilizing Export Revenue
(percentages)
GDP
Share

Export
Share

Commodity
Revenue

Export
Revenue

ill

CV
(3)

CV

(2)

Copper Exporters
Chile
Zambia

(14)
(34)

62

18
21

17
22

(3)

(.15)

(4)

(.66)

Coffee Exporters
Brazil
Colombia

22

14
10

(4)

(7)

(2)

(.03)
(.00)

County/
Commodity

91

(42

One-Year
Risk Cost ~rcent of income) if Consumer
(a)
(b)
(c)
Diversified
Diversified
Specialized in
Across
Across
Exports
Commodity
Economy
(5}
(6)
(72

~

\J1

(4)

26
58

15

1984 figs
from
1986
WDR
Source: IMF (1991), World Bank Commodities Division for commodity price data
Notes:

(2)
(3)
(4)

is the unweighted average of the annual shares of commodity exports in total export revenue
is the SD of percentage deviations from centred 5-yr MA commodity export revenue
as for (3) but for total export revenue

Table 1 Commodity price instability, 1950-1986

Coefficient of variation, Eercentages
Commodity
1950-69
5-yr
price
MA
·change
Cocoa
Coffee
Tea
Sugar
Cotton
Jute
Rubber

21
12
7
35
6
20
16

5-yr
MA

25
16

22
24
19
38
13
12
18

11

39
13
22
24

1970-86
price
change
28
35
23
47
19
18
23

Source:

Newbery (1990, Table 5.1)

Notes:

Price change is the standard deviation of 2(p 1 -p 1_ 1 )/(p 1 +p 1_ 1 ).
5-year MA is-the CV of deviations from the 5-year moving average.
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Table 2 Squared coefficient of variation of prices, 1950-1986
:eercentages
Commodity
5-yr
MA
Cocoa
Coffee
Tea
Sugar
Cotton
Jute
Rubber

4.4
1.4
.05
12.3
0.4
4.0
2.6

Source:

Table 1

1950-69
price
change

5-yr
·MA
4.4
5.8
3.6
14.4
1.7
1.4
3.2

6.3
2.6
1.2
15.2
1.7
4.8
5.8

47

1970-86
price
change
7.8
12.3
5.3
22.1
3.6
3.2
5.3

.,.··<'r·f¥:f-·

Table 3 Effects of stabilizing copper and coffee prices, 1961-1986
percentages

Country
Copper
Chile
Zaire
Zambia
Papua New
Guinea

Coefficients of variation
Average
Revenue
Exports
Revenue
Exports
export share' mnstabilized: ,,stabilized.. ·•.·, unstabilized stabilized,
(1)
(2)
(4)
(3)
(5)
50
39
88
20

18
16
18
33

17
16
16
13

12
31
18
14

8
24
12
13

Brazil
Colombia

22
43

22
19

22
15

17

16

10

10

Source:

World Bank data

Notes: (1)

is average share of exports in total export revenue
is the CV of deviations from 5-yr MA export revenue
is the CV of deviations from 5-yr export revenue valuing the exports at
prices stabilized at their 5-yr MA level
is the CV of deviations from 5-yr MA total export revenue
is the .CV of deviations from 5-yr MA total export revenue valuing the
exports at prices stabilized at their 5-yr MA level

Coffee

(2)
(3)

(4)
, (5)

All export revenues were deflated by the Index of Manufacturing Unit Value
(MUV).
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Table 4 Persistence of price shocks, 1900-1987
Commodity

Persistence
Autocorr
measure

Rice
Palm oil
Coffee
Bananas
Wheat
Sugar
Cocoa
Tea
Beef
Maize
Lamb
Average

0.11
0.13
0.38
0.45
0.46
0.52
0.65
0.72
1.0
1.1
1.30
0.61

Timber
Wool
Jute
Hides
Cotton
Tobacco
Rubber
Average

0.1
0.35
0.4
0.43
0.67
0.73
1.0
0.51

Oil
Silver
Tin
Lead
Aluminium
Zinc
Copper
Coal
Average

0.51
0.65
0.65
0.73
0.93
1.0
1.0
1.0
0.81

Source:

Longest Lag years
Deaton
PER20
0.18
0.13
0.17
0.59
0.24
0.11
0.29
0.37

9
5
11

10
10
6
2
2
0
10
4
6.28

0.19

8
2
5
2
3
4
0
3.43

0.19
0.39

11

8
5
3
5
0
0
0
4.0

0.43

0.31

Cuddington and Urzua (1987), Deaton and Laroque (1989,Table 2)

Notes:
Annual data. The first measure is the sum of the statistically significant
autocorrelation coefficients, as calculated by Cuddington and Urzua and explained in
the text. Deaton and Laroque's measure of persistence is PER20, given in from Table
5 below, and explained therein. The longest lag is the highest order statistically
significant lag.
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Table 5 Variability and persistence of annual commodity prices, 1900-1987

Commodity

CV

AR2

ARl

PER20

PER40
-:'"J't\'•'.':t.

0.82
0.66
0.62
0.64
0.68
0.45
0.53
0.48
0.61
0.39
0.59
0.76
0.68

Bananas
Cocoa
Coffee
Copper
Cotton
Jute
Maize
Palm oil
Rice
Sugar
Tea
Tin
Wheat

0.17
0.54
0.45
0.38
0.35
0.33
0.38
0.48
0.36
0.60
0.26
0.42
0.38

0.91
0.83
0.80
0.84
0.88
0.71
0.76
0.73
0.83
0.62
0.78
0.90
0.86

Source:

Deaton and Laroque (1989, Table 2).

0.59
0.29
0.17
0.31
0.39
0.19
0.19
0.13
0.18
0.11
0.37
0.43
0.24

0.52
0.24
0.11
0.22
0.13
0.09
0.10
0.05
0.08
0.06
0.28
0.18
0.11

Notes:
CV is the coefficient of variation. ARl and AR2 are the first and second
order autocorrelation coefficients of the deflated series of prices. PER20 and·PER40
are the Campbell/Mankiw-Cochrane measures of persistence with window widths of
20 and 40 years.
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Figure 4: Full Insurance and the put option compared
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Figure 5: Examples of consumption-smoothing using a bond and a
put option: i. i. d. case
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